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Property Law. Butler v. Gavek, 245 A.3d 750 (R.I. 2021). An
action to partition a joint tenancy under section 34-15-1 of the
Rhode Island General Laws survives the death of either the plaintiff or defendant pursuant to §34-15-12. Additionally, the estate of
the deceased may appeal an adverse decision as to partition, despite
not being substituted as a party in the action to partition.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

Shirley Butler, the original plaintiff, filed an action in the Superior Court to partition property she owned as a joint tenant with
the defendants, Clarence Butler and Kari Gavek on August 1,
2018.1 The defendants answered on September 20, 2018 and counterclaimed for unjust enrichment and breach of agreement.2 The
plaintiff died while the litigation was pending in December 2018.3
On January 28, 2019, counsel for the plaintiff notified the defendants of the plaintiff’s passing and that substitute counsel was being
appointed for the plaintiff’s estate.4
On February 1, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss
the action under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil
Procedure, prior to the plaintiff’s estate taking any further action
in the proceeding.5 The defendants argued that the partition action
was moot due to the plaintiff’s death because the property was
owned in joint tenancy and therefore, plaintiff’s property interest
transferred to them following the death of the plaintiff.6 A hearing
on the motion to dismiss was scheduled for February 26, 2019.7 The
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Probate Court was also scheduled to appoint the representative of
the plaintiff’s estate on February 26, 2019.8
Prior to the hearing, on February 7, 2019, plaintiff’s attorney
notified the court that an executor would be appointed by the Probate Court, and the plaintiff’s estate would have representation at
the hearing.9 On February 11, 2019, plaintiff’s counsel requested
that the court continue the hearing until the plaintiff’s estate could
be substituted into the case and proper service could be given.10 In
this notice, plaintiff’s counsel also cited to section 35-15-12 for the
proposition that a partition action is not abated by the passing of
the plaintiff.11 However, due to the death of the plaintiff, counsel
notified the court that he did not have authority to take any further
action in the proceedings.12
The hearing on the motion to dismiss was not continued and
took place on February 26, 2019.13 The defendants objected to the
continuance, asserting that the case was moot.14 Counsel for the
deceased plaintiff was present at the hearing, and noted that while
he no longer had a client and did not represent the estate, he again
wanted to put the court on notice of section 34-15-12 and present
his belief that the action for partition survived the death of the
plaintiff.15 The hearing justice granted the motion to dismiss, noting that the plaintiff’s estate did not file an objection to the motion
to dismiss or a motion for continuance.16 On March 18, 2019, three
days after the hearing justice entered the order granting the motion
to dismiss, counsel for the plaintiff’s estate entered an appearance
and filed a motion to substitute.17 The attorney for the estate noted
that the executrix of the plaintiff’s estate was not appointed until
March 12, 2019, and therefore could not participate in the February
26, 2019 hearing.18 However, the Superior Court never held a
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hearing on the motion to substitute and entered a final judgement,
dismissing the action for partition on April 16, 2019.19 Subsequent
to the hearing justice entering an order to grant the motion to dismiss, but prior to the entry of final judgement, the plaintiff’s estate
filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island on
March 25, 2019.20
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

On appeal, the Court addressed two issues.21 First, “[w]hether
a petition for partition survives the death of a plaintiff pursuant to
§ 34-15-12”22 and second, whether the estate had standing to appeal.23 The Court first noted that joint tenancy in real property
exists under the common law and had not been defined by the
Rhode Island General Assembly.24 Under the common law, the rule
of survivorship dictates that after one joint tenant dies, the remaining joint tenants are entitled to the entirety of the estate.25 However, the Court found that the Rhode Island General Assembly
modified the common law by creating a statutory right to partition
joint tenancies under section 34-15-1.26 The Court held that section
34-15-12 dictates that an action for partition will not be abated by
the death of the plaintiff or defendant in the action.27 As a matter
of statutory interpretation, the Court held that section 34-15-12 is
unambiguous, such that, when a joint tenant brings an action under “§ 34-14-1 but dies before the case terminates, § 34-15-12 clearly
requires that the action continue to judgement with heirs or devisees of the decedent, ‘in the same manner as might have been done
had the heirs or devisees been original parties in the action.’”28
Looking to the decision of the hearing justice, the Court found the
19. Id.
20. Id. The Court treated the appeal as timely, despite being filed prematurely. Id. n.1. (quoting Sullivan v. Coventry Mun. Emp.’s’ Ret. Plan, 203 A.3d
483, 846 n.4 (R.I. 2019)).
21. The Court summarily decided the appeal. Id. at 742.
22. Id. at 754.
23. Id. at 755.
24. Id. at 754 (quoting Ruffel v. Ruffel, 900 A.2d 1178, 1188 (R.I. 2006)).
25. Id. (quoting Knibb v. Sec. Ins. Co. of New Haven, 399 A.2d 1214, 1216
(R.I. 1979)).
26. Id. at 754-55 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-15-12 (2020)).
27. Id. at 755 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-15-12 (2020)).
28. Id. (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-15-12 (2020)).
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hearing justice erred in granting the motion to dismiss because
their reliance on the common law rule of survivorship was “contrary
to the plain language of §34-15-12.”29 The Court reasoned that it
was clear the common law right to survivorship is abrogated when
an action under section 34-15-1 is pending, pursuant to section 3415-12.30
The Court next addressed the defendant’s argument that the
estate did not have standing to appeal because the estate was not a
party to the action and the action was extinguished upon the plaintiff’s death.31 The Court rejected the defendant’s argument that the
estate lacked standing to appeal because they were a nonparty to
the action, holding that failure to be substituted under section 3415-12 was not fatal to the estate’s ability to appeal the final judgement.32 The Court reasoned that in enacting section 34-15-12, the
General Assembly intended “to treat heirs and devisees as represented by a decedent’s estate, as parties in the action, such that
they may appeal a final judgement to the Supreme Court.33 The
Court found that the estate was an aggrieved party because they
would hold no interest in the property if the dismissal was upheld.34
Accordingly, the Court held that the plaintiff’s estate had standing
to bring the appeal.35
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court provided clear guidance to
the Superior Court that section 34-15-12 dictates that a partition
action brought under section 34-15-1 is not abated upon the death
of one of the parties.36 The Court provided further guidance that
section 34-15-12 treats the estate as a party to the action, such that
they may appeal a final judgement if they are an aggrieved party.37
This should help the Superior Court avoid mishaps such as the one
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 754-55.
32. Id. at 756.
33. Id. (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-15-12 (2020); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-24-1
(2020)).
34. Id. (citing Lombardi v. City of Providence, 69 A.3d 846, 850 (R.I. 2013)).
35. Id.
36. See id. at 754-55.
37. Id. at 756.
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addressed here, where the partition action was dismissed prior to a
hearing on substitution. The Superior Court now has clear instruction that a partition action is not extinguished upon the death of a
party, such that a party’s estate may be substituted into the litigation for further proceedings.38
One may question why the Court addressed the issue of
whether the action for partition survived the death of the plaintiff
prior to addressing the issue of whether the estate had standing to
appeal the decision. After all, there would be no need to reach the
merits of the issue if the appellant had no standing to bring the
appeal. However, if the partition action extinguished automatically
upon the death of the plaintiff, then the estate could not have been
a party to the litigation, and thus could not appeal. Because the
Court first found that the partition action was not abated upon the
death of the plaintiff, it could then find that the estate could be substituted into the action.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that an action to partition a joint tenancy under section 34-15-1 of the Rhode Island General Laws is not abated by the death of neither the plaintiff nor
defendant pursuant to §34-15-12. The Court also held that the estate of the deceased may appeal an adverse decision as to partition,
despite not being substituted as a party in the action to partition.
David Braga

38. See id. at 754-55.

